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Introduction and cautions
The United States took longer to realize that a weak State does not generate a strong market. They needed the brutal financial crisis of 2008 to wake up. [Would the United States] be turning to the infamous developmentalism, after having flown for many years the flag for neoliberalism, after having preached privatization, liberalization and general deregulation, in the name of an allegedly higher rationality justified by mathematical economic models? 2 Bresser Pereira then cites economic data showing a lagging US economy. Even though it is natural for an advanced country like the United States to have a lower growth rate than developing countries, he goes on to argue that the United States 'is finally acknowledging the high price it is currently paying for having adopted the neoliberal credo'.
the United States with India, China and Brazil-deserve some careful reflection. Was the article simply an example of Brazilian triumphalism at a time when the Latin American giant's political, diplomatic and-above all-economic importance was finally being accepted internationally? Or was Bresser Pereira expressing an understandable satisfaction with the growing acknowledgment, even among orthodox analysts, that, as the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) suggested in a recent memorandum: 4 For the most part Latin America has managed to fend off the brunt of the world economic downturn by avoiding the West's prescriptionsfeaturing canned formulas and impositions by international financial institutions and the developed world that were so popular during the nineties. By all accounts, Latin American countries, even before the global crisis set in, took a realist, home-grown perspective about how to maintain sustainable growth and avoid the financial contagion which later spread to other regions of the developed world.
Were there lessons to be learned from the recent experience of not only Brazil but also other Latin American countries; lessons that might have relevance not just for other developing countries, but also for the advanced world, including Australia? 5 This introductory chapter sets out to do two things: to identify the major shifts in the politics and political economy of the Latin American region in the last 15 years by examining the changed political landscape; and secondly, to sketch possible future scenarios and landscapes over the next decade. In conclusion, the chapter will briefly identify opportunities and challenges for Australian actors-government and non-government-arising from these scenarios.
Some familiar cautions concerning Latin America are necessary. The Latin American region is complex and multifaceted, with a number of key blocs that have been traditionally identified in the following way: Mexico and Central America; the Caribbean (an Anglophone and Spanish-speaking area with several French-speaking island states as well); the Andean region (Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru); Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay); and Brazil, the unique linguistic and historical development and sheer size of which deserves a category of its own. But these familiar subunits are not homogeneous themselves: in recent years, Colombia and Peru have clearly followed a different political and economic pathway from those of its Andean neighbours Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, although the election of the Ollanta Humala government in Peru in early June 2011 did modify some aspects of that country's trajectory. Further south, in the Southern Cone bloc, the experience and interests of the two smaller nations, Paraguay and Uruguay, are often in sharp conflict with the larger and richer Chile and Argentina, and especially Brazil. And so on. In spite of the ever-more-frequent celebrations and endorsements of growing Latin American unity, the region remains an extraordinarily complex area about which generalisations are unwise.
It is also the case that, especially in the political and international relations arenas, the element of novelty and surprise has become steadily more pronounced in the Americas. The rules of the political and economic game have been redefined in many areas, and there is little doubt that this will continue over the rest of the new decade. Old certainties and traditions have been challenged; new kinds of socio-political actors and forces have emerged-an increasingly assertive Indian population is one-and the ways in which Latin American states interact with each other, with the United States-the traditional hegemon in the Americasand with the rest of the world, have also undergone significant changes. When it comes to governments making choices and developing policies and strategies, we are increasingly seeing unexpected outcomes. While continuities in the sphere of economic policy are much clearer, the political game is changing rapidly and outcomes are increasingly unpredictable. All of this makes Latin America a fascinating laboratory for observers interested in tracking political, economic and social change, albeit a laboratory that defies simplistic assessments and projections based on crude ideological assumptions of the political Right and Left.
Latin America has long been the originator of novel political, economic and socio-cultural projects and frameworks; one thinks here of the rise of the structuralist economic analysis pioneered by the teams led by If history has anything to teach us we should expect the Latin American region to continue this innovative role over the next decade, and to continue to surprise even the best-informed observers and stakeholders. Taking bets on the future is always a dangerous project, especially for this author, who was trained as a historian, albeit a historian very much concerned with modern and contemporary history. But it may very well be that the momentous political, economic and cultural shifts that have occurred within the past 15 years in Latin America could once again generate momentum for a new model of development, or at least a new set of imaginaries and sensitivities that blend competing ways of practising politics and economics inherited from the past to forge a new synthesis that comes close to the developmentalism spoken of by Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira in the opening paragraphs of this chapter.
Finally, the rapid increase in the pace of Latin America's insertion into global political, economic and diplomatic circuits must direct our attention to the international arena where uncertainty and surprises have also accelerated in the last five years. The obvious development here is the enormously destabilising impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-10; the sovereign debt crises in Europe of 2010-13; and the emergence of several Asian nations-China in particular but India and Vietnam are also important players-as major economic and political stakeholders.
Making predictions about the future direction of politics and economics in Latin America is, therefore, all the more dangerous these days. Nevertheless, despite the often substantial national and regional differences visible in developments unfolding in political and economic spheres of the last decade, one of the arguments of this chapter is that it is possible to detect some clear trends and to identify ways in which these may develop over the next decade.
One of the most striking trends is the emergence throughout the region of a flexible and non-ideological commitment to economic management. After several decades of rigid adherence to the tenets of neoliberal economics throughout the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries have abandoned religious devotion to the market-most particularly the market dogmatism so common in the 1980s and 1990s-and embraced policies that stress the importance of state intervention in infrastructure, e.g., technology, energy, transport; education, finance, labourmanagement relations; and the general relationships between public and private spheres, in a way that orthodox neoliberal theory could not grasp. Whatever the radical flourishes of official discourse-such as the Venezuelan references terms of trade and his espousal of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) warrant substantial modification in light of the mixed experiences with ISI and the striking improvement in terms of trade for many thirdworld countries in recent years, his work has once again attracted attention from scholars and practitioners in regard to the failures of doctrinaire neoliberalism and the discrediting of much orthodox prescription as a consequence of the global financial crisis of 2007-10. to 'a new socialism' and a 'socialism of the 21st century'-the governments of the so-called Pink Tide, now the largest bloc in Latin America, have certainly not broken with many key elements of the neoliberal package. Nonetheless, they have increasingly insisted on the importance of granting a bigger role for state engineering. The neo-structuralists, who have dominated economic policy-making in these countries in recent years, argue that states must fashion institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody 'public regardedness' rather than personalistic clientelism. Similarly, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Luis Amagro recently described UNASUR as 'the most important political convergence instrument at the continental level', a reference to the organisation's efforts in promoting peace, stability and democratic governance in Latin America.
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The newest regional forum to emerge in the Americas is the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in December 2011 and made up of the 33 Latin American and Caribbean states. CELAC has created a parallel organisation to the traditional and until recently US-dominated Organization of American States and neither the United States nor Canada is a member of the new body. Although CELAC was founded with the active and enthusiastic support of the late Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, the organisation has now become the main regional mechanism for political dialogue among Latin American How far and how quickly these new regional forums and continental organisations develop, and whether hard results emerge from the often overblown rhetoric that has surrounded the launching of some of these initiatives-such as the Bank of the South and other ideas launched by the late President Hugo Chávez-is something that we cannot yet assess.
11 However, tracking and assessing these new initiatives and learning to work with them is one of the major challenges facing many of the non-Latin American statesAustralia is one-that have been accustomed to the more predictable outcomes and behaviours associated with older and more familiar multilateral forums and organisations. The simplistic judgments that developments excluding the United States are unhelpful and anti-American will not be productive and run the risk of seriously underestimating the real and symbolic content of the new order emerging in Latin America.
The changing contours of Latin America 1998-2013
The broad outline of trends in politics and economics is fairly clear. The 1980s saw the end of the right-wing military dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, and the re-emergence of pluralist, more inclusive and more democratic politics. However, such democratic pluralism is tainted by what analysts have termed a significant 'democratic deficit' associated with incomplete removal of some institutional practices and structures created during the dictatorial past, and a less-than-ideal grappling with continuing high levels of poverty and social exclusion. While politics became unquestionably more inclusive in the 1980s and early 1990s, there was substantial continuity in the broad economic strategies followed by civilian governments of all stripes. The era of neoliberalism continued and the so-called Washington Consensus that underpinned the neoliberal vision was not fundamentally disturbed; almost everywhere, the same policy mix prevailed-an emphasis on outward trade- led growth; the liberalisation of trading barriers; privatisation; macroeconomic equilibrium privileged over everything else-although the weighting of individual prescriptions was altered. The only significant shift in the socioeconomic sphere in these two decades was a modest, but regionally uneven shift towards the adoption of policies promoting social and educational investment and welfare.
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In the latter phase of this period there were important developments in regional economic integration-most spectacularly with the launching of Mercosur (founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay and with Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela having associated member status), and of NAFTA (launched in January 1994 by the United States, Canada and Mexico). While NAFTA is an example of a classic Free Trade Area (FTA), Mercosur has been launched as a Customs Union and, especially in its pre-foundational phase, the organisation had an explicit goal of consolidating pluralist and democratic governance and minimising threats of the return of military regimes. Its ambitious goals have also included commitments to the development of inclusive national and regional governance and, with less success so far, to the promotion of a deep regional culture of belonging, sometimes referred to as conciencia mercosureña. These regional economic integration projects have not displaced bilateral free trade agreements such as the one between Chile and the United States. However, there has been a distinct shift from favouring regional agreements over US-driven initiatives-such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which never saw the light of dayto criticism within important Latin American circles, weak support within the US Congress and, above all, opposition by Brazil. The spectacular failure of the FTAA by the end of 2003 was an indication of the real limits to US hegemony in Latin America.
Political outcomes during the 1980s and 1990s were modestly positive-with no significant challenge to the democratising and pluralising effect-although there were problems: for example, brief, and fortunately unsuccessful, military challenges to the new civilian government in Argentina in the 1980s, while the transition to civilian rule in Chile took longer than anywhere else. But, in the economic sphere the result was the famous 'Lost Decade' of the 1980s, lasting in some areas until the early 1990s: an outcome that has led some analysts to talk of the 'Long Lost Decade.' For the 20 years between 1980 and 2000, the economies of Latin America grew by only 11 per cent in per capita terms. This was the worst 20-year growth performance in over a century. income per person, fell dramatically, by 3.1 per cent in the peak phase of the lost 'long decade ' (1980-90) . 13 The era of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) between 1950 and 1970 may have produced some unwelcome outcomes, but its record on growth rates was without question more impressive than the record of fundamentalist neoliberalism during the following 25 years.
A reaction against the politics and economics of ideologically rigid neoliberalism set in all over the region from the mid-1990s onwards. The depth of this reaction and the nature of the political outcomes it elicited were regionally very uneven, but some of the main trends can be identified. Between 1995 and 2014, in country after country, new political constellations emerged-most noticeably at the level of national government, but of course with different timetables and different flavours. A series of centrist, centre-left and left wing governments emerged in virtually all the countries of the region. Prominent exceptions included Mexico, where the conservative Party of National Action (PAN) ruled until 2013 under presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón following the historic defeat in 2000 of the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which had governed Mexico in various guises since 1929. But even here volatility and unpredictability have been striking; Mexico's centre-left PRD party emerged in second place in the 2006 elections-although it has been wracked by division ever since-and it has won and maintained power over Mexico City since 1999, ever since the capital city regained its political independence. The return to power of the PRI after the July 2012 elections marked a return to the political centre, although many of the initial policies introduced by the new PRI, led by President Enrique Peña Nieto, are close to traditional platforms of the nominally more conservative PAN.
The other exceptions are Colombia, although at the regional level-especially in Bogotá, the capital city-left-of-centre coalitions have won power on several occasions, most recently in October 2011; and, to a lesser degree, Peru, although even here the centre-left was growing in strength in the years after 2007, leading to the victory of Ollanta Humala in June 2011. By the middle of 2011 around 70 per cent of the population of Latin America lived under governments that either want to modify elements of the Washington Consensus substantially or-and this is the case for only a few of these new governments, namely Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador-make a sharp break with this set of prescriptions.
In reality, the Pink Tide phenomenon embraced an immense variety of strategies and styles. There was no single model being propounded. However, some common features can be identified. The Pink Tide governments were all, without exception, the result of electoral politics. This is an obvious point but one that warrants some reflection. The fact that, with no exception, the Pink Tide governments have come into office through the ballot box-and in some cases have reaffirmed their legitimacy in numerous electoral and referendum events-means that the shift we have been witnessing has enjoyed much more legitimacy than many left of centre governments in the past. It also means that the leftward shifts have been able to mount political and economic policies that mostly involve occasional breaks with US preferences without bringing about significant and permanent ruptures with Washington, even in the cases of the more radical transitions such as those that have occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador.
The electoral path has also raised a series of challenges for parties and coalitions committed to transformational or emancipatory politics. The coin has two sides. Legitimacy conferred through elections has its advantages; it certainly has involved a radical break with the Latin American Left's traditional suspicions of electoral politics. But, necessarily, it also means that the emancipatory politics that come to prominence in a well-institutionalised capitalist state have had to cope with the resistance of sectors within existing state structures that 'act to constrain, dilute, institutionalize and co-opt mass struggles, to reproduce the old order.'
14 Most importantly, it is crucial to understand that electoral victories can be overturned in future contests. Thus in Chile-ruled by a series of centreleft coalitions of the Concertación since the end of the Pinochet dictatorshipthe Conservative candidate Sebastián Piñera won the presidential election in January 2010, defeating the Concertación's Eduardo Frei (however, the centreleft returned to power in early 2014 under Michelle Bachelet). Further to the north, in Peru, the domination of politics by parties and candidates of the right and centre-right came to an end with the victory in the middle of 2011 of Ollanta Humala. In Venezuela, the era of massive electoral victories by chavista parties has come to an end, judging by the surprisingly slim majority achieved by the governing party and its presidential candidate, Nicolás Maduro, in the April 2013 elections. But outside the sphere of struggles over control of the national government, important changes were also being registered in other political spaces, including the growing prominence of municipal and regional political arenas as locales for non-traditional forces. One thinks here of the emergence of Bogotá and Mexico City in the last few decades as centres of oppositional politics-with the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) maintaining its control over Mexico City over the past 17 years, while various leftist figures, most recently Gustavo Petro, have won power in Bogotá. Another trend has been the virtual disappearance of the option of armed struggle in Latin America, with the exception of Colombia and an increasingly more isolated and marginalised Zapatista (EZLN) movement in southern Mexico.
In the economic sphere continuities still prevailed over ruptures. Neoliberalism certainly entered into a major crisis after the lost decade. As an intellectual discourse with an almost religious dimension, neoliberalism became increasingly discredited as a set of inflexible policy recipes with disappointing outcomes. But, certainly at a national level, the Pink Tide did not bring a major overall shift in economic policy. Statism has been widely discredited, although public sector expansion has been noticeable in certain sectors, for example, in petroleum and gas. The emphasis on export-led development remains dominant. Even in countries with left-wing governments-Venezuela and Bolivia-in spite of sometimes overblown rhetoric by national leaders, capitalist social and economic relations have not been fundamentally challenged.
There have, however, been some extremely important changes registered in the politico-economic arena that are easily masked by an excessive concentration on national electoral politics and the role of traditional parties; an overly narrow focus on the politics of nation states; and a neglect of international political economy.
One particularly remarkable development has been the growing importance in Latin America of involvement by non-traditional state actors-China and Russia in particular, and to a lesser extent India. This is, of course, a regional manifestation of the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China). A push for diversification of their international trade and investment partners by Latin American countries has coincided with a thirst in Asia for raw materials-not just petroleum as is often argued, but also for iron ore, soybeans and other commodities. Elsewhere in Latin America, China has also emerged as a major market and source of investment. The interest in diversifying foreign trade by developing closer links with the People's Republic of China straddles governments of all political colours. In Colombia, for example, one of the countries closely tied politically and militarily to the United States, the country's current president, Juan Manuel Santos, expressed in an interview with the UK Financial Times the range of motivations behind his country's interest in promoting closer relations with China by referring to Asia as 'the new engine of growth for the world economy': a familiar refrain. But as the respected Washington analyst Larry Birns noted in commenting on Santos' declarations:
close ties with the Asian giant are encouraged, in Colombia's case not only by Colombia's status as a rising world power, but also by China's use of soft power…a foreign policy formulation based upon the creation of sustainable trade markets rather than direct physical control of nations…a form of relief for countries that have grown tired of the United States' continual use of hard power in which Washington projects its military strength in order for it to control outcomes in the Western Hemisphere. 15 Birns concluded with an assessment that might be applied equally to other Latin American states regardless of their political colouring: ' Although Santos assured interviewers that Colombia still regards the United States as a strategic partner despite its new relationship with China it is clear that the exclusive one up, one down relationship America [sic] once had, almost by right with Latin America, is steadily unravelling.' 16 This development should not, as some analysts have argued, necessarily be seen as signifying the emergence of an adversarial political relationship between recipient countries, BRIC nations, and the United States. The driving force here is mostly an increased level of trade and investment competition, although such competition can, and often in the past has created fears of loss of US dominance. A flavour of this concern can be gained from a report by the normally balanced and cautious US consultancy firm Price Waterhouse Coopers, which predicted that: in 2020, the G7 (the United States, Japan, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, and Canada) will have an economic weight equal to that of the emerging nations, recently christened the E7: China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Turkey. In 2010, the difference in favor of the G7 is about 35% (in 2000 it was 70%). This margin of advantage will have evaporated in less than a decade. By 2030, China will have overtaken the United States and be first place in terms of economic power. The United States will be closely followed by India, Japan, and Brazil.
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The changing constellation of international political and economic power as it affects Latin America can also be viewed in other arenas. In the last decade the importance of south-south regional diplomacy-involving Latin American states and the BRIC nations plus South Africa-has grown considerably. Some analysts have argued that the development of horizontal ties binding Latin American states to other nations in the Global South is a further manifestation, along with the growing influence and self-confidence of the BRIC nations in Latin America, of the enhanced bargaining capacity of the Latin American bloc in a global system in which old certainties, the dominance of US, and to a lesser degree European hegemony politically and economically, were no longer obvious and rock solid. Put very simply, over the past decade there has been more room for manoeuvre for Latin American states, especially the larger countries, e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, all the more so given the desperate search by developed and developing nations to secure reliable energy supplies.
During the same period some Latin American states and regional forums have exhibited greater boldness and self-confidence in the international arena. Latin American states are no longer-if they ever were-predictable and automatic supporters of the stances taken by successive US administrations. This growing independence or flexing of muscles has been exhibited in a series of events over the last decade. The Brazil-Turkey initiative on Iran-known as the 'swap deal'-in May 2010 is one example, although here Brazilian domestic criticism of Lula's initiative, the extremely negative response of the United States, and subsequent UN Security Council actions taken against Iran exposed the limits of Brazilian power. 18 Other conjunctures in which Latin American states adopted policies that in some way challenged traditional US policies would include the role played by Brazil in the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009; the almost unanimous refusal by Latin American nations to support Washington's position on the Honduran coup in the summer of 2009; and the Obama administration's attempts to reinsert Honduras into the Inter-American system after the elections of November of that year, which brought to power a government whose legitimacy was challenged by many nations in Latin America. It should be noted that many of these new initiatives were initially very fragile. They had difficulties in securing financial support from governments and, as one observer noted, 'they have remained to a large extent as meetings and gatherings of heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs. So the only institution with enough capacity, not only to convene the entire region but also to implement and execute, is the OAS'.
19 Nevertheless, by early 2014 UNASUR and CELAC, at least, had consolidated their position and influence. Latin America's performance in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-10 and in the boom of rising commodity prices visible up to early 2012 has also contributed to the growing self-confidence of many Latin American states. Latin America certainly did not escape completely unscathed. This is particularly the case with Mexico, with its high dependence on the US economy. But in global terms the impact of the crisis on Latin America was less than might have been expected. Once again, the Brazilian experience is worth noting here. Brazil's GDP growth was 5.1 per cent in 2008, with only a small decline in 2009. By early 2010 the growth rate was once again impressive: two per cent in January 2010.
Even though growth rates fell in 2012 and 2013, Brazil's fiscal and monetary discipline-much praised by orthodox observers-plus newly discovered oil reserves have certainly contributed to this favourable outcome.
Some of the most ambitious future economic projects involve continental economic and political cooperation. One much-touted project would involve the building of a South American multi-modal container handling system that would enable goods to be transported from the Pacific coast of South America via railways and highways over or through the Andes and into the Amazon Basin, and down to Manaus in Brazil.
This discussion of recent trends in Latin America has thus far concentrated almost entirely on national, state-level politics and national and international political economy. However, the rapid and often dramatic changes in landscapes in Latin America are also the product of developments in other spheres: in civil society; in the battle of ideas; and in struggles over the definition of national, regional and hemispheric identities. The transformations in Latin America, then, are much wider and deeper than electoral events suggest. Not everything that is important unfolds in presidential palaces or legislatures; the different social actors at the heart of social change in the region, and their often novel ways of conducting politics and economics and envisioning alternative ways of transforming everyday life have shifted debate, undermined old certainties and wounded, sometimes fatally, conventional narratives and prescriptions. Space limitations make a discussion of these topics very difficult, but a couple of developments warrant attention here because they may offer opportunities for a deeper and more productive engagement by Australians on a variety of levels with Latin American actors.
One important development, the significance of which has not been registered sufficiently outside the academy, is the emergence and acknowledgement of what one might call 'Indianism' and questions of indigenous identity in countries with a significant indigenous population. This has been especially visible in the Andean area comprising Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia in particular, although its echoes have also been heard in parts of Mexico, Guatemala and Chile. Given the historic exclusion of the Indian masses from the benefits of economic growth and political power, the emergence of indigenous issues at the centre of political, social and cultural debate is an enormously significant development. The Indianist upsurge is closely linked to the emergence of new social movements and actors all over the Americas, especially notable in the aftermath of the 1992 Columbus Quincentenary celebrations and protests. These new actors have almost without exception-even in the case of the Chiapas-based Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in southern Mexico-practised a politics which has eschewed armed struggle even while it often emphasises innovative forms of direct action and mass mobilisation. The strongest manifestations of this new Indianism, in contrast with much writing and expectation, have been urban and working-class rather than rural and peasant, although both rural and urban movements have been important. The most powerful insurrections in recent Bolivian history with an Indianist but also class content were rooted in El Alto, an informal proletarian and indigenous city on the outskirts of the capital La Paz. Most Mapuches in Chile today, for example, are urban, and large groups of both permanent and transitory indigenous people from Mexico and Central America now live in major urban centres throughout the south-eastern and western United States, as well as in scattered towns and cities in the Midwest and Carolinas in the United States.
In several countries, most particularly Bolivia and Ecuador, the Indianist resurgence has also detonated another fascinating and crucially important political phenomenon: the attempt to refashion the constitutional basis of state legitimacy is no less than an attempt to create a new foundational narrative for nation states. One dimension of this process has been the efforts to write new constitutions that would guarantee indigenous representation in congress and recognise rights to communal property and a degree of autonomy for indigenous peoples. The new social movements that make claims on behalf of indigenous peoples have become important players in Ecuador and Bolivia, sometimes supporting the programs of the so-called Pink Tide governments, but in other cases maintaining a firm independence from political parties and formal legislative processes that has made life enormously complicated for national and regional governments in these countries. In Ecuador, for example, the powerful Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) has been a thorn in the side of President Rafael Correa, accusing his nominally pro-Indian government of betraying the cause.
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Australian observers would not be surprised to learn that an important element in the programs of the new Indianist organisations has been the demand for greater Indian control over decisions on how the environment is to be handled, especially in regions where national and transnational capital have been engaged in exploiting rich mineral and forestry resources. The battle of ideas and politicaleconomic practices around land rights, autonomy, mining, forestry, and other forms of development spurred by an ever-greater demand for resources, has led to bitter struggles and often bloody outcomes in many regions. None of these concerns are foreign to Australia's experience, and there could be fruitful opportunities for the exchange of ideas, histories and experiences between NGOs, governments and academics from the two regions.
Looking to the future
The Pink Tide may weaken in the immediate future, at least in terms of national political rule. In any case, the shift towards greater economic, political and diplomatic autonomy, and the challenges to inherited orthodoxies in Latin America are independent of the ideological make-up of national governments. The tendencies outlined in the first part of this chapter are likely to continue over the next decade. The United States will continue to be by far the most important external economic and political player in the region, but the trends, which have seen a growing European and especially Asian involvement, will continue. The obsessive focus on the United States as a player, common among both left-and right-wing analysts, will increasingly be seen to obscure rather than clarify Latin American developments and our understanding of them. The ideologically driven use of terms such as 'populism' to excoriate policies in Latin America will also be unhelpful.
If commodity prices remain steady-and the upward trend began to reverse in 2012 and 2013-then Latin America's economic growth will continue to be modestly satisfactory. After a slow down in 2009, Latin America's economic growth in 2010 reached 5.9 per cent and while growth fell to three per cent in 2011, rebounding a little to 3.5 per cent in 2012, the region's overall performance is still impressive compared to the performance of the European and US economies. The price of petroleum is especially significant here-most obviously for Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador. However, a double dip in the global economy would have a serious dampening impact given that recent economic growth has been overly dependent on international trade. Still, current projections by orthodox analysts have Latin America following the Asian region in terms of economic growth over the US economy and that of its even more troubled EU partners.
The significance of Brazil's emerging profile on the world stage cannot be underestimated: it is the single most important geopolitical and economic development in Latin America. Australia should be monitoring this development very closely, as it may have implications for increasing the weight of our diplomatic presence in Brazil, and accelerating plans for improving the currently woeful level of air communications with Brazil.
Over the next ten years we are unlikely to see a return to overt military intervention in politics of the kind that we witnessed in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. Civilian rule and electorally legitimated regime transitions are likely to continue. However, there are some warning signs and a number of possible flash points. The military intervention in the ousting of the Honduran Zelaya government in 2009 was deeply worrying, and the decision by the United States to revive its Fourth Fleet in the Caribbean is not a welcome sign. The Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorian borders may still be the sites of inter-state conflicts and these may exacerbate conflict throughout the entire region. The sheer scale of petroleum reserves now claimed by Venezuela and Brazil necessarily will force oil and energy-rich states to step up their capacity to defend their resource-rich territories, and this could be the source of inter-state tensions.
What opportunities might the trends discussed in this chapter offer Australian actors who are engaged or interested in engaging with Latin America?
We need to put much more energy into observing, tracking and analysing ongoing developments in Latin America. Government ministries and agencies, including Austrade, DFAT, the Australian Federal Police, and a variety of intelligence agencies, currently shoulder the burden here. The Council on Australia-Latin America Relations (COALAR) has promoted and supported important research on the Australia-Latin America relationship, and this has increased the gathering of data and analysis, most notably on the export of Australian education resources in vocational and technical education, the teaching of English as a second language, and the provision of university education.
University-based scholars have also made an important contribution. But while there have been some positive developments on the university front-the growth of interest in Latin America in Sydney-based universities; the emergence of the Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies (ANCLAS) at ANU; and the impressive growth of Spanish language teaching throughout the university sector-teaching and research on Latin America outside the language, literature and cultural studies arenas has stagnated and even moved backwards in recent years. Social science specialists committed to Latin America have retired and not been replaced; Latin American Studies programs in several universities have disappeared or been drastically reduced at Flinders University and at La Trobe University; and there are very few dedicated Latin American specialists working in key disciplines such as Politics and International Relations-the ANU is an exception here-while there is not a single university economist whose full-time teaching and research commitments are focused on Latin America. Latin America-focused Sociology, Anthropology and History are also barely represented in the academy, a sad reversal of earlier strengths.
The thinness of the dedicated Latin Americanist social science presence in Australian universities seriously reduces Australia's capacity to engage with Latin American reality, to track ongoing developments and identify and pursue opportunities for fruitful cooperation. As if this was not serious enough, the commitment to Portuguese in the 1970s has reverted to the almost total absence of Portuguese language training in Australian universities at a time when Brazil's political, economic and diplomatic importance has increased; this is a serious anomaly and a major handicap in Australia's ability to study and profit from the Brazilian juggernaut's emergence as a world actor. One modest but potentially effective way of addressing this deficit in universities would be the establishment of what Latin Americans call an 'observatory', the role of which would be to gather data, undertake analyses of unfolding conjunctures, and disseminate this information via printed and electronic/web-based means. Observatories that monitor and analyse developments in their respective areas have emerged, especially since the second half of the 1990s, in a variety of national and multinational institutions such as Mercosur, the European Union, UNESCO, government departments, unions, NGOs, municipal and regional governments. Observatories have focused on both narrowly defined topicsdevelopments in mass media and human rights-and broader issues such as the development of public policy and the tracking of economic, trade and immigration data on a regional scale. 21 An Australia-based and universitysupported Latin American observatory would be able to assemble a group of scholars involved in monitoring developments, collecting data and providing evaluation on ongoing issues. The results of this work would be disseminated online as well as through the holding of regular regional and topical updates 21 Luis Albornoz and Micael Herschmann, 'La experiencia de los observatorios ibroamericanos en información, comunicación y cultura-balance de una breve trayectoria ', UNIrevista, Vol. 1: No 3, July 2006. that might inform and hopefully help shape policy in public and private sectors. Some of the developments mentioned in this chapter warrant particularly close attention from any social science observatory.
The 'Latinisation' of the United States is one of the most dramatic events of the post-WWII period. The Spanish-speaking community has now eclipsed AfricanAmericans as the largest ethnic minority. In 2010, the Hispanic population of the United States reached 50.5 million, 16.3 per cent of the total population, of which the largest component by far comprised Mexican-Americans (31 million). And it is increasingly the case that the growth of Spanish-speakers is now being fuelled more by births than by immigration, both legal and undocumented. There are enormous implications flowing from this for the US economy; such domestic political pressures partly shape and constrain foreign policy choices, and these should be of interest to governments, investors and traders in Australia. But this phenomenon also has the potential to transfer the global character of US society and identity as well as reshape the relationship between the US and Latin America. 22 Today, more than ever, a focus on Latin America that excludes an examination of the spectacular growth of the Latin American population of the US would seriously handicap the work of policy analysis and decision-making.
Another topic of great significance is the emergence of indigenous issues and an enhanced sense of indigenous identity as well as greater indigenous activism and claims-making in Latin America. This is likely to continue growing and should provide a bridge to actors and stakeholders in Australia whose experiences and concerns-relating to development and to community involvement in environmental policy-making-parallel those of Latin American indigenous actors.
Other chapters in this book address some of the more familiar items that have long been on the agenda of those advocating closer relations between Australia and Latin America. In the education area, exports are likely to increase, although at a slow rate due to exchange rate problems caused by the rise of the Australian dollar (a tendency that was reversed in late 2013), and growing competition from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which are experiencing cuts to government budget expenditure on higher education.
The challenges posed by the state of Australia's communications with Latin America have been an ever-present concern in discussions of Australia-Latin America relations since the 1980s. While air links with Chile and Argentina have improved substantially in the last decade, there are still no direct air services to Brazil and the termination of Qantas flights to Argentina in 2012 and Aerolíneas Argentinas flights in mid 2014 were deeply disappointing.
The scale of Australia's diplomatic representation in Latin America is also still modest. Although the re-establishment of an embassy in Peru was a welcome move, the number of embassies in Latin America remains the same as it did 30 years ago. This is a growing embarrassment when one takes into account the impressive growth in Latin American diplomatic representation in Australia at ambassadorial level. Most urgently, since Australia is a middle-level power, its relationship with Latin America necessarily involves it in dealing with at least three other middle-level powers-Mexico, Brazil and Argentina-and our diplomatic presence in, and overall engagement with these countries should be greatly strengthened. This is particularly urgent in the case of Brazil; as this chapter has argued in several places, there is a disturbing lack of fit between Brazil's current and likely future political, economic and diplomatic strength and Australia's insufficiently robust engagement with the Latin American giant.
